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IN T H E UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintitf-Appellee,

:

v*

:

RAYMOND J. VIGIL,

:

Defendant-Appellant•

Case- Mo

yi)U 1 4 I CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION A N D NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary, a second
degree fe] on^

• m< lei \ It .ah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990 ,, and a

finding that defendant w a s a habitual criminal under Utah """ode
Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1990).
This Court has jurisd.p tion to hear uhe appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1 9 9 0 ) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
properly denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence
of the burglary seized 1Iom the trunk ol the ai in whinh he w a s
riding when stopped and arrested by the police.
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on the moti on t o suppieair w i l l no* bn 'J is tin bed ^p appeal
unless they

: *r clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the
il conclusions based on its factual f i n d i n g s ,

the appellate court applies a "correction of error" hiandla ui at

review.

State v. Johnson, 111 P, 2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.

1989), cert, granted,

P.2d

(1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional or statutory
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Raymond J. Vigil, was charged with burglary,
a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990),
and with being a habitual criminal under Utah Code Ann. S 76-81001 (1990) (R. 15-18).
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as
charged (R. 151, 153). The trial court sentenced defendant to
the Utah State Prison for a term of five years to life (R. 21415).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.

The following

summary of the facts is derived from the stipulation of facts
presented by the parties at the hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress and the evidence presented at trial.
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 14, 1989, Sally
Salazar lent her red 1975 Monte Carlo to her 16 year-old son,
Fernando.

He was to drive his sister to their grandmother's

house, about five blocks away, and return home immediately.
However, after dropping off his sister, Fernando went to the home
of defendant, his uncle, where he picked up defcmdant and a third
person.

The three then drove to Bountiful, Utah (T. 160-61, 263,
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265)1.
At approximately 2:00 pi m. the same afternoon, Wilma
C a l d w e l l and h e r son left Lliel J dome in Bountiful to run some
errands,

* -

. * 4: *" j. m. , neighbors d i s c o v e r e d that t h e home

had been t,.

ea emu called the p o l i c e .

A m o n g t h e items

r e p o r t e d m i s s i n g w e r e a t e l e v i s i o n , two V1 R H
and some jewelry (SH. 13, T
A I-

1 t,»dt.( > J c l o t h i n g ,

28-29, 3 6 - 3 7 , 56, 6 3 ) .

County d e p u t y sheriff w a s on patrol near t h e

C a l d w e l l h o m e a: a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3:00 p.m. that afternoon w h e n a
red 1975 C h e v r o l e t M o n t e C a r l o caught his a t t e n t i o n .

He noticed

i.hai the Ihren occupants ol the car w e r e H i s p a n i c m a l e s w h o , b y
the w a y they w e r e dressed, appeared to b e from C a l i f o r n i a .
d e p u t y , w h o *-as r,- t aware tha
the -. ~->

•*-->. *

travel ing 4 5 m. p, r

The

- burglary had been committed i n

*

-:.-T,irce before stopping.it for

a 3 . m .y.-.*.

zone (SH. J J - i 4 , 18 ) .

D e f e n d a n t w a s the front p a s s e n g e r in the v e h i c l e .

The

car was registered tc tl le teei iag- B c:ii:l v er' s m o t h e r , Sally S a l a z a r .
T h e d e p u t y o b s e r v e d that all three o c c u p a n t s h a d been consuming
a l c o h o l ^n

t j i e car

,£r| violation of t h e open c o n t a i n e r Jaw

upon this vl ol atiuri, the speedi ng violation,,

Based

- ^m with the

t e e n a g e r ' s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , and t h e a b s e n c e wt the r e g i s t e r e d
owner of t h e c a r , t h e d e p u t y arrested all t h e o c c u p a n t s and
i m p o u n d e d t h e c a r (SH * 1 4 , T , 7 f. , 1 4 (,»• -49).
L a t e r that e v e n i n g , t h e d e p u t y spoke w i t h S a l l y Salazar
ai id recei ved p e r m i s s i o n t o search h e r c a r , w h i c h h a d b e e n

M T > „ r e f e r s t o t h e trial transcript; "SH." refers to the
suppression hearing transcript.
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impounded upon the arrest of her son and his companions. Ms.
Salazar had not given defendant permission to use or be in her
car.

In a warrantless search of the car's trunk and interior,

the deputy and two other officers recovered a television, two
VCR's, a bag of clothing, and jewelry, all of which matched the
descriptions of items reported missing from the Caldwell
residence (SH. 3-11, T. 198-99, 205).
Based on these facts, the trial court ruled, inter
alia, that the evidence of the burglary seized from the car was
admissible because it was obtained by the police pursuant to Ms.
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car (T. 38-39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, defendant challenges only the admissibility
of the evidence seized from the car pursuant to Ms. Salazar's
consent.

The trial court correctly ruled that that evidence was

admissible because it had been seized by the police pursuant to
Ms. Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF THE BURGLARY SEIZED FROM THE CAR
WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SEIZED BY
THE POLICE PURSUANT TO MS. SALAZAR'S
VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF HER CAR.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should
have suppressed the evidence of the burglary recovered in a
warrantless search of Ms. Salazar's car because (1) the initial
stop of the vehicle was pretextual, (2) the arrests of defendant
and his companions were a pretext for impoundment of the vehicle,
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and (3) Ms. Salazar's consent to search the vehicle was not
voluntarily given.

The lower court ruled against defendant on

each of these points (T. 35-40).

Although defendant's pretext

arguments may find support in several recent decisions of this
Court, the ultimate issue of whether the evidence seized from the
car was admissible can be resolved against defendant on the
ground that the evidence was seized by the police pursuant to Ms.
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car.
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or
equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665
P.2d 1302, 1204 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

A stop of a

vehicle is, of course, also justified when the officer has
probable cause to believe that either the vehicle or an occupant
has violated the law.

Ibid.

Defendant does not claim that the Delaware v. Prouse
standard was not met when the officer stopped the vehicle in
which he was a passenger for speeding.

Rather, he claims that

the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when
the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion to support the stop."

United States v. Guzman, 864

F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
-5-

In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep.
13, 17 (Utah June 28, 1990), this Court set forth the following
standard for determining whether an unconstitutional pretext stop
has occurred:
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer
would not have stopped the driver for the
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext,
the stop is unconstitutional.
2
754 P.2d at 979.

The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable

officer would have made a stop under the circumstances, not
whether the officer could have made a stop.
test is an objective one.

Id. at 978. The

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Guzman,

Insofar as Sierra suggests that the Prouse reasonable suspicion
test and the pretextual stop test are components of a single test
upon which to evaluate the validity of the vehicle stop, it is
incorrect. The Prouse standard and the pretext stop standard are
two distinct standards to be independently applied. The former
provides the basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of
the initial seizure of the vehicle (which is usually for a
misdemeanor traffic violation), while the latter is relevant to
only the evidence of another crime (usually more serious than the
traffic violation) discovered pursuant to the vehicle stop. This
is made clear in Guzman, where the Tenth Circuit treated the
government's objection to the court's adoption of a Sierra-type
pretextual stop standard as follows:
Contrary to the Government's argument,
our approach will not "severely" curtail "the
ability of the New Mexico Police . . . to
enforce traffic laws." Brief of the
Appellant—United States of America at 14.
No prosecution for violation of a traffic
regulation will be affected. Police officers
may always issue appropriate citations to
drivers who violate traffic regulations.
Only evidence of a more serious crime
discovered pursuant to such a stop will be
excluded if the stop was unconstitutionally
pretextual.
864 F.2d at 1518.
-6-

864 F.2d at 1517. Given the various applications of this
standard by the Court, compare, e.g., Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-79,
with State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah June 28,
1990), and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), it
is not clear whether, under the facts of the instant case, the
officer's stop of the vehicle would be considered a pretext stop.
Nor is it clear whether the arrests of defendant and his
companions would, under the facts, be considered a pretext for
impoundment of the vehicle, such that defendant could challenge
the subsequent seizure of evidence of the burglary as fruit of
his unlawful arrest.

See Easton v. Hurita, 290 Or. 689, 625 P.2d

1290, 1295 (1981) (a police officer may arrest and book
individuals into jail for misdemeanor traffic offenses so long as
the officer can point to specific, articulable facts justifying
that action).

But, the Court need not address these questions to

affirm the trial court's suppression ruling.
Generally, a passenger in a vehicle who has no valid
property or possessory interest in the vehicle does not have
standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of it.
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).

However, although some

courts have read Rakas as barring a passenger in a vehicle from
challenging the legality of a stop of the vehicle, see, e.g.,
Kayes v. State, 409 So.2d 1075 (Pla. App. 1981) (passenger
without standing to object to illegal stop of vehicle), the
better view is that a passenger has standing to challenge a stop

-7

and to claim that evidence seized from the vehicle is
inadmissible as fruit of the illegal stop.

See, e.g., State v.

Eis, 348 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1984) (both passenger and driver had
standing to challenge stop of vehicle, for when "the vehicle is
stopped they are equally seized; their freedom of movement is
equally affected");

State v. Scott, 59 Or.App. 220, 650 P.2d 985

(1982) (passenger may claim evidence is fruit of illegal stop).
See generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.3(e) at 324-25
(1987 & Supp. 1990).

Although defendant had no valid property or

possessory interest in the vehicle in which he was riding, he
would nevertheless have standing to challenge the evidence seized
pursuant to a search of the vehicle on the ground that it was
fruit of an allegedly illegal stop of the vehicle.

Because

defendant alleges, inter alia, that the evidence should have been
suppressed because the stop of the vehicle and the subsequent
arrests of its occupants were unconstitutionally pretextual, the
State will assume for purposes of argument that defendant has
standing to challenge the evidence seized from the vehicle in
3
which he was a passenger.
The trial court ruled that defendant did not have standing to
challenge the search of Ms. Salazar's car, in which he had no
valid property or possessory int€*rest (SH. 37-38). This is not
inconsistent with the position taken by the State on appeal.
Having determined that the stop cind the arrests of defendant and
his companions were legal, the trial court correctly concluded
that defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of
the car and the seizure of evidence of the burglary. In the
absence of an illegal stop or arrest, defendant would not have a
"fruit of the poisonous tree" challenge to the evidence seized
from Ms. Salazar's car, and he would not otherwise have standing
to challenge that evidence for the reasons discussed in DeAlo.
The State has decided not to address defendant's arguments
regarding an illegal stop and arrest, since it believes a far

-8-

Having said this about the standing question, the
clearest ground for affirming the trial court's suppression
ruling is that, even assuming the stop and arrest of defendant
were pretextual and therefore illegal, defendant was not in a
position to challenge the evidence subsequently seized from the
car, because that evidence was obtained pursuant to a search
voluntarily consented to by the car's owner, Ms. Salazar.

That

consent constituted an intervening event that purged the taint of
any prior illegality associated with the stop and arrest of
defendant.

See State v. Ribera# 597 P.2d 1164, 1169-70 (Mont.

1979) (owner's voluntary consent to search of vehicle constituted
an intervening event sufficient to attenuate the taint of the
defendant's illegal arrest); State v. Guzy, 134 Wis.2d 399, 397
N.W.2d 144, 151-52 (Wis. App. 1986) (adopting the legal theory
set forth in Ribera but remanding for more detailed findings on
the owner's consent to the search of his vehicle), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 407 N.W.2d 548 (Wis.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 979
(1987);

Josephs v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 491, 501-02 (Va.

App. 1990) (Barrow, J., dissenting) (recognizing that driver's
valid consent to search of car could be intervening cause or
event that attenuated taint of illegal stop of vehicle in which

the defendant was a

passenger).

Cont. simpler resolution to the issue of the admissibility of
the challenged evidence is found in Ms. Salazar's intervening
consent to the search of her car. However, if this Court agrees
with the trial court's conclusions that neither the stop nor the
arrest was unconstitutionally pretextual, defendant clearly does
not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle or the
seizure of the evidence found in it.

-9-

The trial court found that Ms. Salazar had voluntarily
consented to the search of her vehicle (SH. 38-39).
ruling the court specifically referred

In its

to the following exchange

during Ms. Salazar's taped telephone conversation with the deputy
who had impounded her car in which she sought to recover the car:
Officer: Well, we need to look through your
car before we let it go. Is that all right
with you?
Salazar:

Well, will I have to be there?

Officer: You don't have to. No, you don't
have to be there. There's been a list done
on the car. Nothing is going to be missing
or anything. We just need to look through
it. But we want to make sure that's all
right with you.
Salazar:

Yeah.

Yeah.

I guess so.

(SH. 38). At trial, Ms. Salazar specifically testified that the
officer had not put any a pressure on her or applied any threats
in obtaining her consent to the search of her car (T. 174).
Defendant argues that the court erroneously found that
Ms. Salazar had voluntarily consented.

To determine whether

consent to search is voluntary, a totality of circumstances test
applies to ascertain whether the consent was in fact voluntarily
given and not the result of "duress or coercion, express or
implied."
(1973).

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49
The issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented

is a question of fact on which the state carries the burden of
proof•

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980);

-10-

Scneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227.4

Under these standards, the

trial court's finding that Ms. Salazar's consent was voluntarily
given was not clearly erroneous.

See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d

326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted,
1990).

P.2d

(Utah

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record that even

suggests Ms. Salazar's consent was obtained through police
exploitation of the allegedly illegal stop and arrest of
defendant.

See State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15-17

(Utah June 28, 1990).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that Ms.
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car rendered the
evidence of the burglary found therein admissible against
defendant.

4
While this Court has made clear that the state has the burden
of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly specified
what standard of proof applies to the burden. In State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and State v.
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court appears to
have adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof for this
inquiry. However, in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (preponderance
of evidence standard applicable to determination of voluntariness
of confession), and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 17778 n.14 (1974) ("controlling burden of proof at suppression
hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence"), the preponderance of the
evidence standard appears to be appropriate. See also Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be
shown by preponderance of the evidence"); 4 LaFave, Search and
Seizure, § 11.2(c) (1987) (noting split in courts on question).
-11-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should
^

affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this<^r

day of August,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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